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On having bad persons as friends 
Intuitively, one who counts a morally bad person as a friend has gone wrong 
somewhere. Yet it is far from obvious where exactly they have gone astray. 
Perhaps in cultivating a friendship with a bad person, one extends to them certain 
goods that they do not deserve. Or perhaps the failure lies elsewhere; one may be 
an abettor to moral transgressions. Yet another option is to identify the mistake 
as a species of imprudence²one may take on great personal risk in counting a 
bad person as a friend. In this paper, I argue that none of these intuitive 
explanations are entirely convincing; for many such proposals run contrary to 
widely accepted features of friendship. However, they do point us in the direction 
of a more satisfying explanation²RQH ZKLFK FRQFHUQV D SHUVRQ¶V PRUDO
priorities. An individual who counts a morally bad person as a friend is, I 
propose, one who betrays a distinct kind of defect in her values.  
Introduction 
Most of us are fortunate enough to count morally decent persons among our friends. 
Such friends not only provide us with love and support, but extend their kindness to 
others as well. Yet it is no condition of entry for friendship that one be morally 
exemplary. Indeed, it does not seem at all incoherent to suppose that someone might 
count a morally bad person among their friends.1 Such cases are by no means 
unfamiliar²Nietzsche was friends with Wagner, Copperfield with Steerforth, Rick 
Blaine with Louis Renault. Yet they surely strike us as puzzling all the same; one who 
 
1
 +HUHDIWHU,RPLWWKHµPRUDOO\¶DQGLQWHQGIRUµEDGSHUVRQ¶WRGHQRWHDmorally bad person. 
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enters into a friendship with a bad person very much seems to have gone wrong 
somewhere.  
In what follows, I limit my investigation to what I take to be the most interesting 
cases. These exhibit four key features. First, the individual who counts a bad person as 
a friend is not herself a bad person. This is not to say that the individual in question is 
a moral saint. She may very well be guilty of the occasional moral lapse. Yet she is 
certainly someone to whom we would be hesitant to attribute a morally bad character.  
Second, the individual who counts a bad person as a friend does not suffer directly 
as a result of his dispositions or his actions.2 On the contrary, we can imagine that this 
person treats her incredibly well. Perhaps he is always keen to offer support, and never 
fails to make good on his promises. Insofar as the effects of the EDGSHUVRQ¶VFKDUDFWHU
are concerned, it is only ever others who may suffer.  
ThirdDQGUHODWHGO\WKHEDGSHUVRQ¶VGLVSRVLWLRQVRUDFWLRQVDUHKDUGO\²if ever²
made salient to the individual who has entered into a friendship with him. His 
disgraceful values and misdeeds are seldom drawn to her attention. This is not to say 
that the individual has befriended a bad person unknowingly. She is most certainly 
aware of his moral vices. But she finds it rather easy to look the other way, and 
continues to do so as she enjoys his kindness and good company. 
Finally, this person is quite uncontroversially a bad person. It is not merely that he 
is guilty of moral mishaps; his faults are far from benign. Perhaps he harbours a strong 
disdain for the poor. Or maybe he is inexcusably racist. He might even have a long 
 
2
 Purely to avoid ambiguity, I will use the female pronoun to refer to the individual who counts a bad 
person as a friend, and the male pronoun to refer to the bad person.  
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history of lending support to reprehensible causes. (I shall have more to say about the 
kind of vices I have in mind shortly.)  
Now, it is incredibly plausible that something has gone awry here. There is the strong 
intuition that the individual who counts a bad person as a friend has made some sort of 
mistake. Or, in any event, familiar reactions to these friendships would seem to suggest 
as much. It is not uncommon to express exasperation here (µ,GRQ¶WNQRZKRZ\RXFRXOG
be frieQGV ZLWK VXFK D SHUVRQ¶ RU EHZLOGHUPHQW µ+H¶V UHDOO\ \RXU IULHQG"¶), and 
indeed, moral judgment µYou reall\ VKRXOGQ¶W EH IULHQGV ZLWK KLP¶). All such 
responses seem not only commonplace, but warranted. And all suggest that our 
individual has, at least in some sense, gone wrong. 
Yet where exactly does the individual who befriends a bad person go wrong?  My 
aim in this paper will be to supply an answer to this question. As will become evident 
in the ensuing discussion, our answer to this question bears upon a number of other 
questions of interest in the contemporary debate surrounding the nature of friendship. 
These include (but are not limited to) how we should best conceive of the distinctive 
duties to which friendship gives rise, and whether friendship is properly thought of as 
a phenomenon that lies beyond the scope of morality. Though I will not take a strong 
stand on these latter issues here, I do believe that my arguments have important 
implications for how we ought to approach them. 
The road ahead is as follows. I begin by motivating the possibility of friendships 
with bad persons; for some are of the view that such friendships are not properly called 
friendships at all (§1). I then move on to consider three solutions to our puzzle that 
seem plausible on first appearances. These are, respectively, that the person who 
extends friendship to a morally bad person goes wrong by violating requirements of 
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moral desert (§2), being indirectly responsible for his moral misdeeds (§3), and taking 
on great personal risk (§4). To my mind, none of these proposals are entirely plausible. 
This is not to deny that each proposal is getting at something important; my claim is 
not that we ought to reject them wholesale. My more moderate contention is that they 
are at best partial explanations that GRQ¶WVHHPWRget to the heart of the phenomenon 
under investigation. In §5, I develop what I take to be a far more satisfying explanation. 
According to the proposal that I shall develop, an individual who counts a bad person 
as a friend goes wrong in cultivating an objectionable sort of moral complacency, 
discounting important moral values that ought to occupy a suitable role in her moral 
priorities.  
§1. Is friendship with a bad person possible? 
For the philosophical purposes of this paper, I will assume that a friendship with a bad 
person is possible. Though this strikes me as highly plausible, it does run contrary to 
the well-domesticated Aristotelian idea that true friendship must be premised upon 
mutual recognition of moral goodness.3 This theme lives on in some contemporary 
accounts of friendship, which take it to function as a kind of apprenticeship in moral 
character (Thomas 1989, Sherman 1993).  
Let me briefly say something by way of response. It does not seem at all true to me 
that friendship need be premised upon any mutual recognition of virtuousness. Far from 
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 In fairness to Aristotle, he does allow for different kinds of friendship. However, it would be a 
mistake to classify him as a pluralist. On AristotlH¶VYLHZ, a friendship involving a bad person is but a 
shadow of the real thing (Nicomachean Ethics, 1157a12±19) 2QO\ WKRVH ZKR ³« are good in 
themVHOYHV´DUH³PRVWWUXO\IULHQGV´ (1156a6±12). 
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being an apprenticeship in moral character, friendship can sometimes require us to act 
contrary to our moral obligations. TheUHLVVRPHWKLQJWRWKHROGMRNHWKDW³DIULHQGZLOO
KHOS\RXPRYHKRXVHDJRRGIULHQGZLOOKHOS\RXPRYHDERG\´&RFNLQJ	.HQQHWW
S7KRXJKWRVVLQJFRUSVHVLQWRULYHUVDQGO\LQJWRDGHFHDVHG¶VUHODWLYHVDUH
not hallmarks of virtuous character, they may very well be the hallmarks of an excellent 
friend.  
Moreover, and as Alexander Nehamas observes, friendships can be expressed 
WKURXJK³FULPHFUXHOW\DQGLPPRUDOLW\´S; see also Cocking and Kennett 
2000, p.286). The titular characters RI5LGOH\6FRWW¶V (1991) Thelma and Louise are 
FHUWDLQO\ QRW LQYHVWHG LQ RQH DQRWKHU¶V PRUDO IORXULVKLQJ WKH\ VKRRW SHRSOH IRUFH
others into the boots of cars, and commit armed robbery. And each does so for the sake 
of the other. But it is difficult to deny that they share a deep and genuine friendship.  
I have said something about what friendship is not (or need not be). It will be helpful 
to say a bit more about what friendship is.4 In regarding the relationship between our 
individual and the bad person as a friendship, I will be supposing that it exhibits many 
qualities that are commonly thought to be important for (if not constitutive of) it. I will 
assume, for instance, that their relationship is marked by a concern for one another, and 
mutual affection,ZLOODOVRVXSSRVHWKDWWKH\GHVLUHRQHDQRWKHU¶VFRPSDQ\DQGWKDW
they share experiences together; they are excited by the prospect of spending time 
together, and each is disappointed if they rarely have occasion to do so. Though there 
are surely other hallmarks of friendship, the significance of these features in particular 
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 I thank an anonymous referee for pressing upon me the need to do so. 
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is widely recognised. (See for example, Telfer 1970-71, Annis 1987, and Jeske 1997.) 
And to my mind, they are of fundamental importance.  
Some (though perhaps not all) may take these to be features only of what is 
sometimes FDOOHGµWUXHDQGJRRGIULHQGVKLS¶Perhaps we would be inclined to judge 
our individual less harshly if she were merely a friend to the bad person, rather than a 
good friend to him. As we shall see, however, it is surprisingly difficult to fault a person 
for being a good friend²even when her doing so conflicts with moral ideals. This is 
not to suggest that our individual is immune to moral evaluation. But I will suggest that 
she is more readily criticisable for how she chooses her friends than how she treats 
them.  
A final clarification concerns what is needed to count as a morally bad person. 
Developing necessary and sufficient conditions for morally bad personhood would take 
me too far afield. But let me say a little more to clarify what I have in mind.5 I am 
concerned here with characteristically moral vices that we tend to regard as especially 
serious²cruelty, strong disregard for the welfare of others, callousness, and the like²
that shape an individual¶VSUDFWLFDOSURMHFWVDQGKRZWKH\QDYLJDWHWKHLUZD\DURXQG
the world. (Whom they would choose to hire for a job, or the social policies they favour, 
for example.) We might compare these with less serious moral vices such as rudeness 
and miserliness. We might also distinguish them from other traits that may reasonably 
be callHGµIDXOWVRIFKDUDFWHU¶EXW GRQ¶WREYLRXVO\TXDOLI\DVPRUDOYLFHVLQHSWLWXGHDQG
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 I am very grateful to an anonymous referee here for helping me to avoid ruling out too many persons 
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cowardice, say.6 The latter strike me as closer to personal failings than moral ones, 
though they many very well affect how our moral characters manifest themselves.7  
We should also distinguish those whose are explicitly racist (say) from those who 
are explicitly egalitarian but harbour implicit racist attitudes. The latter may certainly 
have room for moral improvement. But I think we should be hesitant to label everyone 
with unsavoury results on an implicit association test a morally bad person²especially 
if their implicit biases conflict with the values with which they identify. (See Zheng 
2016).  
In what follows, then, I will take a morally bad person to be distinguished by their 
having (i) serious moral vices, and (ii) explicit morally reprehensible attitudes with 
which they identify that (iii) shape their normative outlook on the world and their 
practical projects. ,PSOLFLWDWWLWXGHVFDQRIFRXUVHVKDSHVRPHRQH¶VSUDFWLFDOSURMHFWV
as well. But they do not always do so in ways that the individual would endorse.) These 
qualities plausibly come in degrees; people can surely be more or less bad.8  I hasten to 
add that this is nothing approaching a systematic view of morally bad personhood. But 
I hope it will be enough to set us on the path forward. 
 
6
 It is admittedly difficult to erect a neat and tidy distinction between moral and non-moral vices. 
Those who are unsympathetic to the distinction I draw here are free to take me to be asking a more 
restricted question: a question regarding what (if anything) is morally amiss in befriending someone with 
these qualities in particular. 
7
 As Daniel Haybron (2002, p.272) observes, ineptitude and cowardice do not seem to improve 
VRPHRQH¶VPRUDOFKDUDFWHUHYHQLIWKH\³GHIDQJ´her moral vices.  
8
 Indeed, there must plausibly be some constraints upon the extent of a SHUVRQ¶V badness of character 
LIZHDUHWRLPDJLQHWKDWDµPRUDOO\RUGLQDU\¶LQGLYLGXDOFRXQWVKLPDVDIULHQG. While it is not absurd to 
suppose that such an individual might enter into a friendship with a racist, it stretches the bounds of 
plausibility to suppose that she might befriend the head of the Klu Klux Klan. 
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§2. The Desert View 
According to what I shall call The Desert View, a person who forges a friendship with 
a bad person goes wrong in extending to him certain goods of which he is undeserving. 
The goods in question are the dividends of friendship: kindness, support, good 
company, and the like. It is tempting to think that one ought to give reward only where 
reward is due. And the person who counts a bad person as a friend seems to have failed 
woefully in that regard. The kindness, acceptance, and support that are characteristic of 
friendship are surely goods of which a bad person is undeserving.  
Though it may be tempting, The Desert View is, to my mind, implausible. It is far 
from obvious that extending goods to our friends that they do not deserve is a form of 
ZURQJGRLQJ :H RIWHQ IRUJLYH RXU IULHQGV HYHQ ZKHQ WKH\ GRQ¶W GHVHUYH RXU
forgiveness, offer them our sympathy even when they are undeserving of sympathy, 
DQGJLYHWKHPDQRWKHUFKDQFHHYHQZKHQWKH\GRQ¶WGHVHUYHLW(Sometimes we may 
even be admirable in virtue of doing so.)  
 In proposing that an individual does wrong in extending the goods of friendship to 
one who is undeserving, The Desert View would also seem to misconstrue the nature 
of friendship. It is no essential part of our job description as friends that we be moral 
book-keepers who dole out kindness and support to our friends only insofar as they 
deserve it. Indeed, there is something inherently discomforting in the thought that a 
IULHQG¶V NLQGQHVV PD\ EH WKH SUoduct of some kind of moral balancing act. This 
discomfort is nicely brought out by a scenario that Lynne McFall invites us to 
consider²that of the do-gooder who cheers you up over lunch:  
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Feeling better, you express your appreciation, tell him that he is a 
good friend. He says hHLVRQO\GRLQJKLVPRUDOGXW\«Over Caesar 
salad he tells you about his dear wife, whom he married because no 
one was more in need of love, nor so unlikely to find it. Somewhere 
between the main course and the coffee you realize he was not 
kidding. He is only doing for you what he would do for anyone in 
your sorry state²his duty. (1987, p.16) 
0F)DOO¶VGR-gooder¶VH[FHVVLYHpreoccupation with morality would seem to alienate 
him from those whom he professes to care about. He does not cheer up his friend over 
lunch because he harbours a special concern for her, or because she is his friend. He 
does so because this is simply what duty requires of him. And he appears to do worse 
qua friend as a result. The Desert View would seem to risk rendering us akin to such a 
do-gooder; as people who extend sympathy and kindness to their friends only insofar 
as they take sympathy and kindness to be deserved. 
Of course, an advocate of The Desert View may respond that she need not be 
committed to any particular claim about the motivations upon which friends should act. 
Perhaps she is only FRPPLWWHGWRWKHFODLPWKDWZKDWHYHURQH¶VPRWLYDWLRQVRQHGRHV
wrong by extending the goods of friendship to those who are undeserving.9 But then, 
The Desert View has the potential to bring about a worrying sort of disharmony 
between our motivations and our moral reasons. (See Stocker 1976.) An advocate of 
The Desert View thinks that we ought to extend goods to our friends only when such 
goods are deserved. But this seems difficult to reconcile with the distinctive sort of 
 
9
 I thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out. 
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partiality that characterises our deep concern for those closest to us (Blum 1986, 
Kolodny 2010). The motives upon which we act when we extend kindness to our 
friends do not seem subordinate to moral principles. Indeed, perhaps they cannot be if 
we are to succeed in being true friends to others. True friends are surely moved to cheer 
each other up by the special sort of concern that they have for one another qua friends²
not by the fact that doing so would help them to meet their daily quota of good deeds.10  
But perhaps we have been unfair to the advocate of The Desert View. Perhaps it is 
not an unearned benefit to which she objects, but rather, the absence of a suitable kind 
of penalty. She may take the failure involved in counting a bad person as a friend to be 
one that concerns punishment rather than reward. It is not implausible that we may have 
duties to condemn the corrupt and vile persons whom we encounter. And these duties 
would seem to apply to our friends as well; for we often do call out our friends on their 
moral failures. We might tell them off for ignoring the pleas of a hungry beggar, or 
criticise their infidelity. So perhaps the individual who enters into a friendship with a 
bad person goes wrong by not availing herself of such duties. She lets his moral failings 
pass over. 
The latter variety of The Desert View seems promising. We may very well have 
duties to help our friends to navigate a respectable path through life. Indeed, this might 
 
10
 Historically, these sorts of considerations have been thought to tell against impartialist views, 
according to which our duties to be partial towards our friends have their source in basic normative 
principles. Such views have been thought to carry the uncomfortable implication that our commitments 
to our friends are subordinate to our commitments to particular moral values (Stocker 1976, Brink 1999). 
I do not here assume that the impartialist cannot answer to this charge. However, I do think she had better 
be capable of doing so (promising attempts include Baron (1991), Jeske (1997), and Collins (2013)). If 
the impartialist cannot satisfactorily accommodate the commitments that we have towards our friends, 
then (I am inclined to think) so much the worse for the impartialist. 
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be thought to be part and parcel of treating them as moral agents. In failing to treat our 
friends as they deserve, then, perhaps we do them a disservice; perhaps we do wrong 
to them. 
Yet we should be careful not to make too much of our duties to exact penalties upon 
our friends when they fall by the moral wayside; for we tend to regard such duties as 
defeasible. We very often make exceptions of our friends. Perhaps my close friend 
Jones merits reproach on account of her penchant for fur coats, the animal fur industry 
being something that I regard as morally objectionable. I am usually disposed to rebuke 
others for such purchases, or to shoot them dirty looks as they walk on by. Nonetheless, 
it is not at all unintuitive to suppose that I might refrain from extending the same 
treatment to Jones. I might very well WKLQNWRP\VHOIµ-RQHVLVDJRRGVRUW She is always 
incredibly kind to others, and is far more supporting of my personal projects than 
anyone else. 6R,¶OOlet this one slide¶. 
Sponsors of The Desert View might agree that cases like that of myself and Jones 
are commonplace. But it may be thought that such behaviour is properly regarded an 
inevitable moral hazard of forging personal relationships²it is behaviour that ought to 
be tolerated rather than acclaimed. In making exceptions of our friends, then, perhaps 
both our individual and myself are indeed guilty of a mistake: we both fail in our duties 
to condemn them. 
But contrary to what some might expect, I think that DIULHQG¶V tendency to make 
exceptions of us is something that ought to be celebrated. Far from being a mistake, 
this habit seems to be something that underwrites our willingness to reveal our true 
selves to them. It is our friends to whom we turn to confess our moral sins. And these 
confessions GRQ¶W VHHP PHUHO\ LQFLGHQWDO WR WKH SKHQRPHQRQ RI IULHQGVKLS. They 
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arguably play an important role in enabling close relationships to flourish. Mutual self-
disclosure not only cements bonds of trust, but also functions to signal the good will 
that friends expect of one another (Thomas 1987, p.223; Annis 1987, p.349; White 
1999, p.82; cf. Reiman 1976, p.32; Cocking & Kennett 1998, p.518). 
Our choice to confide in our friends is, at least in great part, underwritten by the 
H[SHFWDWLRQWKDWWKH\ZRQ¶WEHVRTXLFNWRGHOLYHUMXGJPHQWXSRQXVZKHQZHGRVR
Under such circumstances, one anticipates tolerance and understanding²not a weigh-
in on the moral scales. Indeed, this seems to be precisely what renders a friend an apt 
moral confidant; it is their willingness to give us the benefit of the doubt, to see things 
from our perspective, and to provide an environment in which we can comfortably 
admit that we are far from paragons of moral virtue.  
Importantly, none of this is to suggest that our friends never do (or should) call us 
out on our wrongdoing. Our friends may even be especially well-placed to criticise us, 
since they can do against a background of acceptance where there is less need to get 
defensive.11 It is not my intention here to suggest WKDW LQIOXHQFLQJ D IULHQG¶V PRUDO
character for the better is something we should never do. I only claim that there is far 
more to friendship that moral education. Moral lenience can be important for 
friendships to flourish, and we can sometimes be justified in setting aside any duty we 
may have to improve our friends as moral agents. 
The variety of The Desert View that emphasises an absence of punishment therefore 
seems to make too much of our duty to penalise our friends when they fall short of 
moral standards. In doing so, it suggests a highly implausible account of friendship; 
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 I thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out. 
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one which paints a friend as judge, jury and executioner. The Desert View would have 
us withhold the goods of friendship from the morally unworthy. Yet it seems 
characteristic of friends that they respond to moral misdeeds with lenience and 
empathy²not a healthy dose of moral desert. 
Still, even if our duty to condemn our friends is defeasible, one may deny that such 
a duty is defeated in this case, the bad person being a bad person and all. An advocate 
of The Desert View might insist that our individual is indeed obliged to ensure that the 
bad person reaps some sort of penalty²via criticism or reproach, perhaps. However, 
this seems to amount to a partial explanation at best; RQHWKDWGRHVQ¶W get to the real root 
of our puzzle. For suppose now that the individual were to take our advice; suppose 
that she did chastise the bad person for his moral failings. Would we then deny that she 
goes wrong in maintaining a friendship with him? It is certainly possible that she goes 
wrong to a lesser degree. But it strikes me that there is still some moral residue in need 
of explanation. She can rebuke him all we like, but there remains the distinct impression 
that she goes wrong somewhere in counting him as a friend.  
§3. The Abetting View 
The Desert View proposed to explain the wrong involved in counting a bad person as 
a friend in terms of the wrong that one does to them. The Abetting View suggests a 
different perspective; perhaps our individual does wrong to others when she extends 
her friendship to a bad person. In cultivating this friendship, she may very well be an 
abettor to moral transgressions; for her support and kindness makes life rather good for 
the bad person, and moreover, it suggests to him that he can, despite his woeful 
character, continue to function as an accepted member of society who is capable of 
14 
 
forging meaningful relationships with others.12 Her friendship therefore does 
something to weaken any motivation this person may have had to improve himself as a 
moral agent. She thereby does wrong by others who suffer as a result. She is, to some 
significant degree, responsible for the harm that ensues.  
I think there is room to question the extent to which our individual can properly be 
KHOG UHVSRQVLEOH IRU WKH EDG SHUVRQ¶V PLVGHHGV RQ DFFRXQW RI their friendship. It is 
certainly not obvious that friendship in and of itself can implicate us in a moral crime. 
Suppose that my friend has what I regard as a moral vice: she is indifferent to the 
suffering of animals, and has no qualms about ordering veal when out to dinner. Do I 
thereby claim some significant degree of responsibility for the lives of the calves that 
she consumes? That seems hard to swallow, and it has some pretty unsavoury results if 
LWLVDFFHSWHGLI\RX¶OOH[FXVHWKHSXQV 
If I am out to enhance my moral credentials, then it seems that I should do my best 
to cut ties with those friends whom I regard as morally sub-par, and instead seek to fill 
my address book with the good Samaritans and humanitarians of the world.13 In forging 
friendships with such moral paragons, I can hope to be an accomplice in making the 
world a better place; for the support and kindness that is part and parcel of my friendship 
will make life rather pleasant for these good folk, and moreover, it will suggest to them 
that they are worthy of forging meaningful relationships with others. My friendship will 
 
12
 On this point, see Annis (1987, p.350), and White (1999, pp.85-6), who suggest that friendship 
enhances self-esteem through helping us to conceive of ourselves as beings of value. 
13
 Of course, the suggestion here is slightly tongue-in-cheek. One cannot plausibly replace a stock of 
morally mediocre friends with a stock of virtuous ones. )ROORZLQJ0LOOJUDPSIULHQGVGRQ¶W
seem fungible in this way.  
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therefore motivate them to continue in their efforts as exemplary moral agents. I thereby 
do right by others who benefit as a result. I am, to some significant degree, responsible 
for the good that ensues. 
But this is madness. The extent to which one can claim credit for DQRWKHU¶V moral 
accomplishments is not merely determined by whether or not one has entered into a 
friendship with them. It is consistent with being friends with someone that one 
contributes very little if at all to (at least some of) their personal endeavours. Friendship 
is consistent with being indifferent²or indeed, firmly opposed²WRWKHJRRGWKDWRQH¶V
saintly friends are doing. It seems that we would at least be inclined to attribute less 
responsibility to someone under such circumstances. One would surely merit far more 
acknowledgement for DIULHQG¶VQREOHFKDULW\YHQWXUHVLIthey had themselves donated 
generously, or actively participated in the fundraising. 
7KLVLVQRWWRVXJJHVWWKDWRQHPXVWFRQWULEXWHGLUHFWO\WRDIULHQG¶VDFFRPSOLVKPHQWV
if they are to merit any acknowledgement. We often thank friends and family in our 
speeches when we accept awards, not necessarily because they contributed to the book 
or to the scientific theory, but because they supported us with love and 
encouragement.14 My intention has only been to suggest that it debatable whether our 
individual is to any significant or morally interesting degree responsible for the bad 
SHUVRQ¶V behaviour purely on account of their friendship. Were she to actively 
encourage his morally questionable pursuits, then such an attribution of responsibility 
may very well be fitting. BXWLWGRHVQ¶WVHHPHVVHQWLDOto friendship that we encourage 
or affirm everything that our friends do. 
 
14
 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for the excellent example. 
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There is, however, another recourse for sponsors of The Abetting View. They may 
argue that it is not RXU LQGLYLGXDO¶V friendship with the bad person per se that is 
problematic, but rather, the terms of their interaction. What is likely to be of particular 
FRQFHUQLVWKDWRXULQGLYLGXDODOORZVKHUIULHQG¶VEDGEHKDYLRXUto go unchecked; she 
absolves herself of any duty to shape his actions or his character. Indeed, she may even 
be especially well-placed to influence him for the better; for he may care about his 
IULHQG¶V opinion in a way that he does not care about the opinions of others.15 Thus, 
SHUKDSVRXULQGLYLGXDO¶VUHVSRQVLELOLW\ lies in her failure to exercise this influence; in 
her failure to try to shape hHUIULHQG¶V actions or his character.   
Yet this suggestion seems to run into similar trouble as the advocate of The Desert 
View did when she elected to emphasise an absence of reproach. Suppose that the 
individual were to take our advice; suppose that she did endeavour to influence the bad 
person to improve himself as a moral agent. Would we then withdraw our verdict that 
she goes wrong in maintaining a friendship with him? Once again, it is possible that 
she goes wrong to a lesser degree. Her efforts might be somewhat exculpatory. So 
perhaps The Abetting View does at least offer us some insight into what her failure 
consists in. But this still falls short of providing us with a satisfying explanation; even 
if our individual did attempt to mould the bad person into a better person, it is still 
difficult to shake the intuition that she goes wrong somewhere in having such a 
friendship²even if it is admitted that she goes wrong to a lesser degree.  
Before proceeding, I should note that I do not wish to deny an intuition from which 
The Abetting View seems to derive much of its appeal: that our individual does wrong 
 
15
 I thank an anonymous referee for bringing this to my attention. 
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by others in counting a bad person as a friend. My intention has only been to suggest 
that the language of moral responsibility may not be the most fruitful way of 
understanding the wrong that she does to them. In my view, the wrong is better thought 
of as an expressive one. I defer further development of this idea to §5.2. To my mind, 
it is a more promising avenue for accommodating the intuitions that seem to motivate 
The Abetting View. 
§4. The Risk View 
:HDUH\HWWRILQGDVDWLVI\LQJDQVZHUWRRXUTXHVWLRQ%XWSHUKDSVWKLVLVEHFDXVHZH¶YH
been looking for explanations in all the wrong places. Perhaps the person to whom our 
individual really does wrong is herself. This is the explanation suggested by The Risk 
View. According to this proposal, one who enters into a friendship with a bad person 
places herself in serious jeopardy. A bad person is likely to have a long history of 
treating others rather badly (or DVWURQJGLVSRVLWLRQWRGRVR:KDW¶VWRVWRS him from 
treating his friends the same way? 
Of course, we stipulated at the outset that this is unlikely to happen; we assumed 
that the individual who counts a bad person as a friend does not suffer directly as a 
result of his actions. The stipulation wasQ¶WXQPRWLYDWHGIRUEDGSHUVRQV WHQGWREH
remarkably discriminatory in their treatment of others. Alongside selective 
maltreatment, one often sees remarkable kindness extended to a select and precious 
few. Whatever we have to say about slave owners in the US, many served as loyal 
friends to one another. And Heinrich Himmler was, by all reports, a loving father; ³
his family and friends did not have to fear that he was plotting their GHDWKV´ (Cocking 
& Kennett 2000, p.288, emphasis in original).  
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<HWHYHQLIVXFKFRPSDUWPHQWDOLVLQJLVFRPPRQZHVKRXOGQ¶WVXSSRVHWKDWLWLV
IRROSURRI7KHEDGSHUVRQ¶VDWWLWXGHVGRVHHPWRUHYHDODZRUU\LQJSRWHQWLDO7RGD\KH
is discriminatory towards group x. But so long as he is prone to prejudice and malice, 
there is the danger that he could come to develop the same reprehensible attitudes 
towards group y tomorrow²a group of which a friend forms a part. So I think we can 
at least grant that bad persons pose a certain kind of risk; they could one day extend to 
their own friends the same malice and contempt that they extend to others.  
According to The Risk View, then, our individual is being imprudent, or perhaps 
even downright reckless. Yet even if this were true, it cannot be the whole story. The 
Risk View takes our individual to be guilty of a prudential error. In doing so, it puts her 
failure on a par with that of the diabetic who befriends the owner of the local sweets 
store. But her failure is surely nothing of the sort. Insofar as she goes wrong in counting 
the bad person as a friend, she plausibly goes wrong in a moral sense as well. The Risk 
View would therefore seem to misidentify the nature of the fault in question; it mistakes 
a moral error for a prudential one.  
%XWSHUKDSVZHVLPSO\KDYHQ¶WDSSUHFLDWHGWKHPDJQLWXGHRIWKHULVNLQTXHVWLRQ
3HUKDSVWKHUHDOULVNKHUHFRQFHUQVWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶Vreputation. It is often said that our 
friends are reflections of ourselves. In cultivating a friendship with a bad person, one 
may be WDUUHGZLWKWKHVDPHEUXVK<HWWKLVZRQ¶WGRHLWKHUWe very often risk our 
reputation for the sake of other things that we value, and our choice of friends is no 
exception. Perhaps in befriending a gambler or a snob, I risk being perceived as reckless 
or snooty. But so long as the trade-off is one that I regard as worthwhile, it seems 
difficult to charge me with a prudential mistake. If my reflective standpoint is one from 
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which I would endorse the goods of such friendships over the reputation-related risks 
that they pose, then my trade-off is surely not properly thought of as a profound error.16  
Indeed, the danger here would seem to be overblown in any case. To befriend those 
ZLWKIDXOWVLVQRWQHFHVVDULO\WRSOD\IDVWDQGORRVHZLWKRQH¶VUHSutation. We do not 
tend to find ourselves fretting over the dangers that our stuck-up or reckless friends may 
pose to our moral profile (though this may no doubt be the province of those desperate 
to keep up appearances). I myself am inclined to let my humble, low-maintenance 
habits do the talking²purchases from thrift shops, microwave dinners, and the like. 
Of course, it might be thought that the snobby and the reckless differ from our bad 
person in the severity of their flaws. Those who tolerate benign moral faults such as 
these may very well inherit less moral taint than those who forgive extreme vices. (I 
shall return to this thought in §5.) But even if we grant that there is some risk to our 
LQGLYLGXDO¶V UHSXWDWLRQ this GRHVQ¶W VHHP WR get to the heart of the problem. If she 
perceived any real danger here, then she could very well elect to keep her friendship 
with the bad person hidden from the public eye.17 Doing so would seem to do little to 
immunise her from the charge that she has gone wrong somewhere. We would still 
 
16
 2IFRXUVHRXUYHUGLFWKHUHZLOOOLNHO\GHSHQGXSRQZKDWZHWDNHDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VSUXGHQWLDOJRRG
to consist in. Though my remarks suggest an idealised desire conception, my case does not rest upon it. 
Objective list theorists might likewise regard friendsKLSDVSDUWDQGSDUFHORIDQ LQGLYLGXDO¶VJRRG²
perhaps even one to which her reputation ought to be subordinate. 
17
 I believe that WKLVDOVRDQVZHUVWRWKHZRUU\WKDWRQH¶VIULHQGVKLSZLWKDEDGSHUVRQPD\HQGDQJHU
RQH¶VRWKHUIULHQGVKLSV*RHULQJS405) notes that bringing along an unsavoury character to happy 
hour is apt to scare others away. This may be true, but it is certainly possible for someone to divide her 
time among her friends (as many of us plausibly do). 
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think that such a friendship was a mistake on her part, even if it were a mistake that she 
kept well-hidden.  
But not all is lost for The Risk View just yet. There is another variety of the proposal 
to consider: perhaps it is moral danger to which we expose ourselves when we enter 
into friendships with bad persons. $IWHU DOO ZKDW¶V WR prevent the bad person from 
requesting KLVIULHQG¶VKHOSZKHQKLV bad habits land him in trouble? This is consistent 
with our stipulation that WKHEDGSHUVRQ¶VDFWLRQVDUHKDUGO\HYHUPDGHVDOLHQWWRRXU
individual. We are only supposing that there is some small risk that he will, on one 
occasion, enlist her services when he finds himself in a spot of trouble. Perhaps this is 
all it would take for the danger here to present a real worry.18  
Though the moral variety of The Risk View seems more promising than its 
SUXGHQWLDOFRXQWHUSDUW,GRQ¶WWKLQNWKDWH[SRVXUHWRPRUDOULVNgets to the heart of the 
important species of moral failure that is involved in counting a bad person as a friend. 
A willingness to place oneself in moral danger is close to being constitutive of 
friendship in any case. If we are concerned to be true friends to others, then it seems 
that we must sometimes be prepared to act wrongly when doing so is necessary in order 
to do right by them. There is an important element of truth in the claim ³DIULHQGZLOO
help you move house, a good IULHQG ZLOO KHOS \RX PRYH D ERG\´ Following Dean 
Cocking and Jeanette .HQQHWW³WUXHDQGJRRGIULHQGVPD\ZHOOEHOHGWRDFWDJDLQVW
 
18
 As well as the danger of (i) failing to fulfil moral duties to others, one might claim that there is the 
additional danger of (ii) failing to fulfil moral duties to oneself. (I thank an anonymous referee for 
pointing this out.) Given considerations of space, I cannot afford to consider this possibility in any great 
detail. But I suspect that what I say in response to (i) applies (with appropriate transformations) to (ii) as 
well. Just as friendships more generally can lead us to act contrary to our moral duties to others, they 
may very well lead us to act contrary to our moral duties to ourselves as well. 
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competing moral considerationVLQWKHSXUVXLWRIRQHDQRWKHU¶VZHOIDUH´³RQHPLJKW
even think [this] DUHTXLUHPHQWRIFORVHIULHQGVKLS´S 
Indeed, and as Cocking and Kennett observe, friendships of all sorts would seem 
to place us in moral danger. If we were to restrict the pool of potential friends to those 
who would never land themselves in trouble, then there may very well be no one left to 
befriend. So LWGRHVQ¶WVHHPOLNHDQH[posure to moral risk can adequately explain the 
wrong involved in cultivating a friendship with a bad person. If our individual goes 
wrong in cultivating such a friendship, then so too do we all who enter into friendships 
with those who are less than morally perfect. 
§5. Friendship and moral priorities 
We began with the question as to where an individual goes wrong in counting a bad 
SHUVRQDVDIULHQG7KHDQVZHUVFDQYDVVHGVRIDUGRQ¶WVHHPWRSURYLGHXVZLWKPXFK
in the way of a satisfying explanation. In what follows, I will suggest that we can 
identify such an explanation by focusing our attention upon the individual herself; for 
her choice of friends tells us something important about her²most notably, it tells us 
something about her moral priorities. 
§5.1 Choosing friends 
Before we can properly understand the nature of RXULQGLYLGXDO¶Vfault, we first need to 
appreciate the sense in which our friends are something that we choose. Here, I want to 
draw upon certain remarks from Laurence Thomas (1987), whose work on the element 
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of choice in friendship is instructive.19 As Thomas rightly notes, we do not tend to go 
about life shopping for persons to put on our speed dial. That is to say, our choice of 
friends is not typically the result of an intentional pursuit on our part. Instead, there is 
a ³«sense in which we grow into friendships´ ,QGHHG³we can even be surprised that 
RXULQWHUDFWLRQZLWKVRPHRQHKDVJLYHQULVHWR´VXFKDUHODWLRQVKLSS 
However, and importantly, this is not to deny us any agential say in the matter. 
Friendship is QRWPHUHO\VRPHWKLQJWKDWµKDSSHQV¶WRXV:HFDQFKRRse whether or not 
to forge these relationships. Though it is perhaps not so easy to avoid being drawn to 
someone, we do have the capacity to reflect upon just what it is that attracts us to them, 
DQGZKHWKHURUQRWLWRXJKWWR³,WLV´7KRPDVPDLQWDLQV³«one thing to be intrigued, 
fascinated, and even captivated by a person«LWLVDQRWKHUWKLQJWRORVHHQWLUHO\RQH¶V
sense of reason and perspective on things´ (1987, p.221). But whether friendship is the 
product of captivation or something far less seductive, to choose someone as a friend 
is surely to evaluative them favourably. It is difficult to make sense of the suggestion 
that we might choose to enter into a friendship with a person for whom we harboured a 
deep dislike.20  
The point that I wish to emphasise, however, is this: we do not generally like 
everything about our friends. Or in any event, my suspicion is that precious few of us 
 
19
 Since I take the element of choice to be important for understanding where our individual goes 
wrong, what I have to say may not apply (at least not straightforwardly) to the relationships that we have 
with our family members. The element of choice seems diminished here, if not absent. 
20
 I intend to refer to a broad kind of evaluative assessment here; one that includes but is by no means 
restricted to a moral assessment. Our choice of friends is plausibly influenced by qualities aside from 
VRPHRQH¶VPRUDOZRUWKZLWFRROQHVVDQGFRPPRQLQWHUHVWVIRUH[DPSOH:ROISS-3; White 
1999, p.80). 
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do. Most of us will readily acknowledge that our friends have their shortcomings. 
Sometimes, we even like them for their shortcomings. My friend may be hopelessly 
inept at keeping up with foreign affairs, and I may bemoan her lack of interest in the 
ZRUOG¶s troubles. But perhaps I find this quality oddly charming. It might even be 
amusing for me, since I can often trick her into believing that something has happened 
ZKHQLWUHDOO\KDVQ¶WOther-times, we like our friends in spite of their shortcomings. I 
may be GLVDSSURYLQJRIP\IULHQG¶Vmeat-eating habits, but love her in any case because 
she has other qualities that recommend her; perhaps she makes generous donations to 
the poor, and never hesitates to come to my aid when I call upon her to do so.  
But when we like a friend because of or in spite of their shortcomings, this is surely 
EHFDXVHVXFKVKRUWFRPLQJVDUHQ¶WIDXOWVWKDWZHUHJDUGDVparticularly weighty. Thus, 
to acceSWVXFKIULHQGVLVQRWLQ7KRPDV¶VZRUGVWR³ORVHHQWLUHO\RQH¶VVHQVHRIUHDVRQ 
DQGSHUVSHFWLYHRQWKLQJV´7KHFRQVXPSWLRQRf meat and an insufficient concern for 
WKHZRUOG¶VWURXEOHVDUHDUJXDEO\PRUDOIDXOWV<HWWKH\DUHXVXDOO\IDXOWVWKDWZHDUH
willing to live with²especially when their bearer has other qualities to recommend 
them.  
§5.2 The Moral Priorities View 
I have suggested that our friends are something that we choose, and that our choice is 
ordinarily sensitive to certain features of their moral character. This is not to say that 
we choose our friends for their moral credentials. Nor is it even to suppose that their 
moral credentials are what is of the greatest importance to us. What I do want to claim 
LVWKDWZHXVXDOO\H[SHFWDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VFKRLFHRIIULHQGVWREHresponsive to DQRWKHU¶V 
virtues and vices in the following sense: we expect that there are certain vices of which 
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she could not possibly be forgiving²that there are particular moral flaws which no 
wholly decent person could tolerate. To discount such flaws would be to commit the 
very error that Thomas cautions against; it would be to ³ORVHHQWLUHO\RQH¶VVHQVHRI
UHDVRQDQGSHUVSHFWLYHRQWKLQJV´  
Of course, turning a blind eye to a IULHQGV¶PLVJLYLQJVis not always reprehensible. 
Friendship may be thought to have implications for our beliefs as well as our actions. 
(See Keller 2004 and Stroud 2006.) We may very well be permitted, if not required, to 
be epistemically partial toward our friends. But there comes a point at which we cross 
the line between a permissible bias and an objectionable species of moral complacency. 
And the individual who counts a bad person as a friend very much seems to have 
crossed it. 
Some values are incredibly weighty, and as such, they ought to occupy an 
important role in our moral priorities. One could understand an individual who was 
ZLOOLQJWRIRUJLYHDIULHQG¶VIDLOXUHWRUHF\FOHIRUWKLVLVDIDXOWLQVSLWHRIZKLFKZH
could plausibly accept someone. But an individual who discounted DIULHQG¶VUDPSDQW
racism would suggest to us that she could not care less about the values which tell 
against racism, or for the potential victims of racist attitudes. At the very least, she 
would suggest to us that she does not stand for (or is not standing up for) such values 
in the fullest sense. Her willingness to discount vices of this extreme sort would suggest 
that there are certain values to which she is not properly responsive.  
I think that this gets right to the heart of where our individual goes wrong in 
counting a bad person as a friend. The problem is that she likes him in spite of his 
shortcomings, and the shortcomings in question are incredibly weighty. But it would 
seem that they are not sufficiently weighty for her, and this points towards something 
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worrying about her moral priorities. In choosing to pursue a friendship with a bad 
person, she effectively suggests that a serious moral flaw²vehement racism, say²is a 
minor vice that can be outZHLJKHGE\DSHUVRQ¶VRWKHUUHFRPPHQGLQJTXDOLWLHV 
The answer that I want to propose here, then, is that an individual who counts a 
bad person as a friend goes wrong in cultivating a particular fault of character. More 
specifically, she is guilty of an objectionable sort of moral complacency²she excuses 
that which ought not to be excused. Her choice of friends is indicative of something 
awry in her values; for her moral priorities seem wholly disordered. She would 
prioritise the good company or the benefits that this person affords her over the values 
that he flouts with abandon. To her mind, it is not particularly important if a friend does 
wrong by others, so long as he does right by her. ,QGHHGWKDWKHUIULHQG¶VLPPRUDOLW\
is not a sufficient concern for her suggests that she may not be a wholly decent person 
either.  
Call this proposed explanation The Moral Priorities View. Before proceeding to 
draw attention to the benefits of this approach, let me first assuage a potential concern. 
One might worry that my arguments here contain the seeds of their own undermining. 
I began by supposing that our individual was someone whom we would be hesitant to 
call a bad person. Yet I have now suggested that she may not be perfectly decent. Does 
this not suggest that she is a bad person after all? 
Though moral complacency is indeed a moral flaw, I do not think that it suffices 
to warrant classifying our individual as a bad person. It need not follow from her 
complacency that she identifies with any reprehensible moral values. And moral 
complacency is not a vice that we tend to regard as especially serious. Many of us are 
prone to trade in our values when opportunity presents itself; to buy chocolate that is 
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not fair trade because we prefer the taste, or to purchase clothes that were made by 
people subjected to poor working conditions because they are more affordable. There 
LVFHUWDLQO\URRPIRUPRUDOLPSURYHPHQWKHUH%XWLWGRHVQ¶WVHHPWRIROORZIURPVXFK
complacency that we are morally bad people.21 
Having (hopefully) dispelled this potential concern with the proposal, let me say a 
little more to motivate it. The Moral Priorities View can, I think, capture many of the 
intuitions that motivated its rivals, while avoiding their associated problems. Though I 
agree with sponsors of The Desert View that it is unfitting to extend the goods of 
friendship to a bad person, I do not propose to understand this unfittingness in terms of 
desert. The unfittingness attaches instead to the disordered moral priorities which 
underlie choosing him as a friend in the first place. To count a bad person as a friend is 
to prioritise the potential gains of a friendship over the moral costs paid in the currency 
RIRQH¶VRZQYDOXHV. 
Further, I agree with sponsors of The Abetting View that the individual who counts 
a bad person as a friend does wrong by others. However, I do not assume that she is to 
some significant degree responsible for his behaviour. Insofar as she does wrong by 
otKHUVWKLVLVEHFDXVHWKH\GRQ¶WRFFXS\DVXLWDEOHUROHLQKHUPRUDOSULRULWLHV it is not 
particularly important to her whether her friend does right by them, so long as he does 
right by her. Indeed, it may even be argued that such an individual fails in her expressive 
 
21
 Admittedly, it is possible that as the badness of the friend in question worsens, the more poisonous 
the moral complacency could growLQIHFWLQJRQH¶VRZQFKDUDFWHUDVZHOO(YHQLIWKLVZHUHVRKRZHYHU
my arguments would still stand up so long as there were cases in which an individual remains a good 
person on the whole. And it seems to me that there are very many such cases. We regard David 
Copperfield as a decent person in spite of his friendship with James Steerforth. However bad his moral 
complacency, it does not seem sufficiently toxic to contaminate his entire character. 
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duties. It is not implausible that we have duties to hold particular attitudes towards the 
victims of wrongdoing (sympathy, for example, or perhaps anger on their behalf).22 
And a friendship with a bad person may very well signal indifference towards their 
victims. This diagnosis also goes some way towards explaining the intuition that our 
individual would partially redeem herself were she to attempt to influence the bad 
person to change his ways; for these efforts would signal to us that other people may 
occupy a more suitable role in her moral priorities after all.  
The Moral Priorities View can also make sense of an intuition that motivates The 
Risk View²that the individual who forges a friendship with a bad person does wrong 
to herself in some sense. In cultivating moral complacency, she would seem to have 
failed somewhat in her capacity as a moral agent. But unlike the Risk View, The Moral 
Priorities View does not cast her failure as a merely prudential one. Nor does the latter 
attribute to her the mistake of placing herself in moral danger²a mistake (if it can be 
called that) that we should think is part and parcel of friendship in any case.  
Indeed, if I may offer a diagnosis, this seems to be precisely where alternative 
H[SODQDWLRQVRIRXU LQGLYLGXDO¶VHUURUZHQWZURQJQHDUO\DOOSURSRVHG WR ORFDWHKHU
mistake in something that we take to be part and parcel of genuine friendship. Yet if we 
are really concerned to do justice to the phenomenon of friendship, and to capture the 
distinctive duties to which it gives rise, then it is difficult to fault individuals for 
overriding some of their moral obligations in order to be true friends to others. Once 
we have extended our friendship to another, it seems that we should be prepared to 
make exceptions of them, and to take on associated risks; for that is precisely what 
 
22
 See Brennan and Lomasky (1993), who discuss the ethics of expression in relation to voting. 
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friendship permits²and perhaps even obliges²us to do. However, and  importantly, 
this assessment is not wholly exculpatory; for we can still fault an individual for 
choosing a bad person as a friend in the first place. Though we are not generally 
criticisable for befriending others in spite of their shortcomings, I have argued that we 
are so criticisable when those shortcomings are incredibly weighty.  
§5.3 Caveats and clarifications 
An individual who counts a bad person as a friend is, I have suggested, guilty of moral 
complacency. Let me now supplement this claim with some further subtleties and 
important caveats. The first caveat concerns the nature of moral complacency. I do not 
intend for it to refer to a stable trait of character; such complacency may very well be 
local to the friendship. Our individual need not generally be complacent when it comes 
to moral issues (though, in some such cases, we may suspect that she is).  
The second caveat concerns ignorance. I have been operating upon the assumption 
that her frienG¶VEDGQHVVRIFKDUDFWHULVVRPHWKLQJWKDWKDVDOZD\VEHHQknown to our 
individual. But some may very well be duped into thinking that a friend is morally 
upstanding. My proposal does not indict those who befriend bad persons unknowingly.  
Though ignorance can excuse, it is a difficult question just how often it does. It is 
QRWLPSODXVLEOHWKDWDQDJHQW¶VHSLVWHmic resources or her historical context could be 
exculpatory. One who chooses an unapologetically sexist person as a friend today 
seems considerably worse than one who did so centuries ago. Perhaps the people of the 
past were not only unaware of the immorality of sexism, but had little hope of ever 
coming to appreciate it. It is difficult to charge such individuals with moral 
complacency if we cannot reasonably expect them to have recognised that their friends 
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were bad people. Some may want to claim that they failed in their duties to be 
sufficiently reflective. But for those who (like myself) are sympathetic to Gideon 
5RVHQ¶s (2003, p.65) VXJJHVWLRQWKDW³RQHLVQRUPDOO\XQGHUQRREOLJDWLRQWRUHWKLQN
the uncontroversial normative principles that form the framework for soFLDOOLIH´WKLV
may be a hard pill to swallow. 
This element of moral luck may extend be\RQGRQH¶VKLVWRULFDl context. Whereas 
some of us have the luxury of choice, others may find themselves in social 
HQYLURQPHQWVLQZKLFKWKHSRRORISRWHQWLDOIULHQGVLVKRSHOHVVO\QDUURZ$QDJHQW¶V
social setting may be one in which many candidates for friendship are rather bad people. 
So we might be reluctant to judge her too harshly should she choose to befriend such 
persons. We might regard her social context as something that excuses her from 
criticism. Or we think it inappropriate to blame her for her choice. 
This suggests that degrees of criticisability are likely to vary case by case. Someone 
who knowingly enters into a friendship with a bad person may be less criticisable than 
one whose friend becomes bad over time. Once we have forged meaningful 
relationships with others, we naturally want to think the best of them, and it can 
understandably become difficult for us to see the worst. (This is, in part, why I am 
inclined to regard the initial choosing as a more fitting ground for criticism.) 
A further subtlety arises from cases in which an individual seems to befriend a bad 
person in the pursuit of some greater good²in order that she may exert some influence 
over them, and benefit others in turn, say. Far from being the product of moral 
complacency, this choice appears to stem from deep moral commitments. However, in 
such cases, I think we should be reluctant to say that an individual has truly chosen 
another as a friend. What she rather seems to have chosen is to pretend to be a friend. 
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As I have suggested, to choose someone as a friend is to evaluative them favourably, 
and one who enters into an association with a bad person for purely instrumental 
reasons such as these is unlikely to do so. It therefore seems difficult to maintain that 
their association is a friendship rather than a farce. 
Conclusion 
Although there is a strong intuition that an individual who counts a bad person as a 
friend goes wrong in some important sense, it is surprisingly difficult to identify where 
she has gone astray. I suspect that this difficulty is owing to a peculiar feature of 
friendship. As philosophers have long recognised, friendship seems to be a domain of 
life in which we often take ourselves to be justified in setting aside some of our moral 
obligations. Thankfully, however, this feature of friendship only renders the puzzle 
interesting²not insoluble. Though our duties to our friends have the potential to take 
precedence over our moral obligations, this is not a carte blanche for moral apathy. We 
can expect decent persons to be suitably discriminating in their choice of friends, and, 
absent excusing conditions, we can take those who are not to merit moral criticism. 
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